Validating generic metrics of fairness in game-based resource allocation scenarios with crowdsourced annotations by Grappiolo, Corrado et al.
Validating Generic Metrics of Fairness
in Game-based Resource Allocation Scenarios
with Crowdsourced Annotations
Corrado Grappiolo1, He´ctor P. Mart´ınez2, Georgios N. Yannakakis2
1 Center for Computer Games Research, IT University of Copenhagen, Denmark
cogr@itu.dk
2 Institute of Digital Games, University of Malta, Malta
{hector.p.martinez, georgios.yannakakis}@um.edu.mt
Abstract. Being able to effectively measure the notion of fairness is of
vital importance as it can provide insight into the formation and evo-
lution of complex patterns and phenomena, such as social preferences,
collaboration, group structures and social conflicts. This paper presents
a comparative study for quantitatively modelling the notion of fairness
in one-to-many resource allocation scenarios — i.e. one provider agent
has to allocate resources to multiple receiver agents. For this purpose, we
investigate the efficacy of six metrics and cross-validate them on crowd-
sourced human ranks of fairness annotated through a computer game
implementation of the one-to-many resource allocation scenario. Four of
the fairness metrics examined are well-established metrics of data dis-
persion, namely standard deviation, normalised entropy, the Gini coeffi-
cient and the fairness index. The fifth metric, proposed by the authors,
is an ad-hoc context-based measure which is based on key aspects of
distribution strategies. The sixth metric, finally, is machine learned via
ranking support vector machines (SVMs) on the crowdsourced human
perceptions of fairness. Results suggest that all ad-hoc designed metrics
correlate well with the human notion of fairness, and the context-based
metrics we propose appear to have a predictability advantage over the
other ad-hoc metrics. On the other hand, the normalised entropy and
fairness index metrics appear to be the most expressive and generic for
measuring fairness for the scenario adopted in this study and beyond.
The SVM model can automatically model fairness more accurately than
any ad-hoc metric examined (with an accuracy of 81.86%) but it is lim-
ited by its expressivity and generalisability.
Keywords: Fairness, Social Preference, Resource Allocation, Dictator Game,
Crowdsourcing, Preference Learning, Support Vector Machines, Feature Selec-
tion, Genetic Algorithms.
1 Introduction
The control and influence of virtual or artificial societies is a highly complex
task, in part, due to the difficulty of predicting the reaction and evolution of the
population to dynamic elements or changes. To monitor and predict evolution
of a society such as a complex adaptive system [37] one needs to monitor the
behaviour of single individual agents within the society. The behaviour of the
individuals collectively generates complex (and emergent) global dynamics and
phenomena (e.g. friendship networks); these in turn affect the individuals, who
will adapt their behaviour autonomously creating a loop that regulates how the
society evolves. For example, the level of collaboration among the individuals in a
local community can be utilised to develop a plan that allows for the integration
of different ethnic group identities [53]. Alternatively, in a virtual society (e.g. a
serious multiplayer game) collaboration could be monitored to effectively teach
soft social skills [61].
In this paper we investigate a number of metrics to measure the fairness that
one individual agent manifests depending on its interactions with other agents.
We claim that fairness is a key feature characterising the interactions, which
could bring further insight into the ongoing complex dynamics. The computa-
tional models of fairness derived can assist in the inference of social preferences,
collaboration, group structures and consequently social conflicts within artificial
societies and complex networks. For instance, an individual who treats individ-
uals differently might suggest the existence of preference; this would also have
implications for the reciprocity of such treatment, and possibly for altruism,
collaboration, and group identities [9, 15].
We restrict our investigation to a virtual environment featuring a resource al-
location scenario, which can allow us to simulate well and isolate scenarios which
can be encountered in real-life situations. In the one-to-many scenario examined,
an agent has to collect and share several resources among a population of agents
divided into two visible groups. Although the scenario under investigation has
features which are common to well-studied social dilemmas, such as the other-
other game [6, 35], the dictator game [3] and, partly, the ultimatum game [9, 15],
the perspective we take and the interpretation we give to the term “fairness”
differs from those adopted in game theory studies. In particular, the metrics we
investigate do not aim to model the utility of the actions performed (inequity
aversion) [4, 16, 17, 48], as we rather focus on identifying measures of equality
of treatment towards multiple individuals independently of the provider’s pay-
off. Furthermore, we are not making the canonical game theoretical assumption
that the individuals considered in our scenarios are merely greedy [15], hence,
we do not aim to investigate how the observed behaviours differ from some ref-
erence value (e.g. Nash equilibrium) [15]. In other words, we aim to investigate
a property of the interactions which is complementary to the concepts of social
preference’s “altruism” and “reciprocity” [15]. Our concept of fairness assumes
that individuals behave “well” (i.e. they are fair) within a subset of individuals
of the population only: fairness aims to provide measures capable of identifying
whether this inequality is occurring.
In this paper we test and compare four simple standard dispersion measures
— namely standard deviation, normalised entropy [57], the Gini coefficient [41],
and the fairness index [29] — that approximate fairness based on the levels
of satisfaction of resource acquisition manifested by the receiver individuals.
We also propose a new, ad-hoc metric — hereafter called temporal group-based
fairness — which is based on single interactions (resource allocations) and the
ability of an individual agent to identify itself as part of a group [9]. We validate
the five metrics against the reports of an online crowdsourcing survey in which
human participants ranked the level of fairness in a wide variety of resource
allocation scenarios. Additionally, we propose a sixth, data-driven modelling ap-
proach, in which genetic-feature selection combined with ranking Support Vector
Machines (SVMs) [30] extract the most relevant context-based features of the
scenario and infer a non-linear mapping between scenario attributes and the
crowdsourced notions of fairness. Results obtained show that all ad-hoc met-
rics are highly consistent with the human notion of fairness as obtained from the
crowdsourced data; the temporal group-based metric proposed, however, outper-
forms the other ad-hoc metrics in this scenario. Finally, the rank SVM, manages
to produce a non-linear model that reaches 81.86% of accuracy in predicting
fairness and proves to be the most consistent with the human notion of fairness.
This study is novel as, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, there has not
been any prior attempt to design, compare and cross-validate metrics of fair-
ness against crowdsourced annotations of fairness. Moreover, this paper builds
upon and extends the metric validation method proposed in [57] by introducing
rank-based crowdsourcing as a tool for annotating complex social dynamics such
as fairness. Clearly, our crowdsourced cross-validation study would strengthen
earlier work, which used the metrics we considered [22–24, 41]; moreover, the
proposed metrics open a plethora of new applications. For instance, they can be
used as a mechanism for evaluating and promoting fairness in educational (seri-
ous) games [22] and, similarly, cooperation/altruism [7]; they could also be used
as metrics to understand and evaluate collaborative games [12, 49, 54] — under
the collective intelligence perspective — together with, or as an alternative to,
the use of expert knowledge [50]. They could be used in fields not strictly linked
to computer games, such as social network analysis [13, 45] or, even further, as
tools aimed to understand the goodness of the partitioning of (social) networks
into community structures [20, 36]. Moreover, the combination of crowdsourcing
with game-based scenarios introduces a first insight for categorising discrepancies
between experiments conducted on artificial societies [2, 14] and those on human
participants [15, 25]. Additionally, the metrics could also be embedded within
such artificial agents, e.g. together with inequity aversion [10, 56], in order to
generate believable, human-like adaptive artificial societies which manifest both
greedy and group-based behaviours [47], allowing thus to further investigate the
notion of evolution of (group-based) collaboration [6, 25, 26, 44].
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 lists some of the
most relevant work to this study. Section 3 describes, formally, the one-to-many
resource allocation interaction scenario used in our research; it illustrates how
the scenario is implemented in a game-based virtual environment, and finally
it delineates the design of the crowdsourcing protocol. Section 4 and Section 5
describe, respectively, the application of the ad-hoc generic metrics of fairness
and the use of SVMs for the one-to-many scenario. Section 6 presents the key
results of this study. Section 7 discusses the limitations and the generalisability
of the key findings and Section 8 concludes the paper.
2 Related Work
This study shares aspects of two main research fields: evolutionary game theory
and game-based modelling. The studies on the ultimatum and the dictator game
— linked to the resource allocation game we investigate in this paper — are nu-
merous (see [3, 16, 17] and [33] among others). The aforementioned studies hold a
pure game theoretical perspective: they aim to understand why the experiments
conducted on human participants deviate from the Nash equilibrium — which
assumes the existence of solely greedy individuals — towards more altruistic
behaviours. The focus of our research, instead, is to provide metrics capable of
capturing whether the individuals of a population are manifesting different levels
of altruism, depending on who they interact with, as a key aspect of complex
dynamics, such as the existence of group structures and group identities [9].
Possibly, even closer to our research aim, there exist studies focused on un-
derstanding the influence that group identities have on the behaviours of the
participants of game theory experiments (see [1, 5, 6] and [34] among others);
however, our work differs from these in its investigation of non-payoff (utility)
based measures. Similarly, Marzo et al. [42] investigated how the existence of
friendship structures affects the levels of altruism of human participants in Col-
ored Trails [18], a computer game with similar mechanics to the ultimatum game.
Their work puts the emphasis on describing how social relationships influence
the behaviour of the participants in their experiment, which is in line with our
assumptions about fairness; however, our work goes a step further by assuming
the existence of such behaviours within the population and aiming to provide
metrics capable of identifying them.
Studies on social preferences have benefited from the relatively novel agent-
based modelling approach for simulating complex dynamics in artificial soci-
eties [14, 26]. This approach has a close, if not exact, relationship with the
research fields of evolutionary dynamics, collective behaviour, and simulation
studies, which aim to better understand how collaboration emerges from the re-
peated interactions among the agents [2, 28, 44]. Although our global aim is the
understanding of the evolution of collaboration and group structures, the study
presented in this paper does not rely on simulations of artificial societies and on
the search for behavioural rules embedded in the agents.
Relevant metrics to fairness, such as balance [38] and symmetry [41] — key
concepts in computer games research and design — have been constructed as
they intuitively have an impact on both the entertainment and learning goals of
the game; however, we argue that the notion of fairness is both different and more
complex than symmetry and balance as it factors in social, behavioural and re-
lationship effects. The context-based metrics proposed in this paper follow both
a top-down expert-driven and a bottom-up data-driven [60] approach for cap-
turing fairness inspired by methodologies for deriving accurate user-interaction
metrics in games [57]. While our expert-driven metrics are directly designed on
key aspect of the one-to-many scenario in use, the evaluation and construction
of the data-driven metric is based on game-based crowdsourced annotations.
The use of crowdsourcing and the correlation analysis we performed has been
used in game artificial intelligence research, though centred on affect modelling
in single player game environments [51, 57, 59]. Our one-to-many interaction sce-
nario, however, provides the basis for the investigation of multi-agent and mul-
tiplayer scenarios [21, 23, 24].
The Fairness Index (FI) we decided to consider in this study [29] belongs to
the vast research field of fairness of resource allocation in information networks
(consider [11, 32, 43, 46, 52] and [55] as a non-exhaustive list). Generally speak-
ing, the standard problem regards the fair allocation of resources (e.g. CPU
and memory) to a set of requesting units (e.g. jobs) in order to e.g. maximise
the overall system’s utility. Although our scenario and aim is more targeted to-
wards social and economical contexts, the positive correlation of FI with the
perceived notion of fairness gathered in our crowdsourcing survey suggests that
FI is relevant for our purposes.
3 Fairness Scenario and Crowdsourcing
This section presents the one-to-many resource allocation scenario on which
we base our fairness modelling studies and describes the game-based virtual
environment designed for encapsulating the key characteristics of the scenario.
The section ends with a description of the protocol followed for crowdsourcing
annotations of fairness through the virtual environment.
3.1 One-to-many Resource Allocation Scenario
Formally, the one-to-many resource allocation scenario investigated in this paper
can be described by the following tuple:
scenario = (P,R,A,G, g, v, s) (1)
where:
– P is the population (society) of n+1 individuals (agents), P = {a0, a1, . . . , an}.
– R is the set of m resources R = {r0, r1, . . . , rm−1}.
– A ⊆ R is the temporally ordered sequence of resources allocated by the
provider agent, A =
{
rt=1i , r
t=2
j , . . .
}
.
– G is the set of group structures present in P ; G constitutes a partition of P .
– g : P → G is the group identity function mapping each agent in P to one
group structure in G. The group identity of the provider agent is unknown
to the observer of the distribution strategy; for simplicity, we will refer to
the single group identity g(ai) as gi.
– v : R → (0, 1] is the resource value function which assigns a value to each
resource in R. For simplicity we will refer to the resource value of resource
rj as vj .
– s : P → [0, 1] is the receiver satisfaction function mapping each receiver
agent in P to a satisfaction value between 0 and 1. For simplicity we will
refer to the satisfaction value of ai, as si.
All the agents ai have their satisfaction values si decreasing over time by a
constant value δ, si ← max(si − δ, 0). An agent ai receiving a resource rj will
have its satisfaction value updated as follows: si ← min(si + vj , 1). Intuitively,
si gives an indication of the amount of resources acquired by ai.
One agent takes the role of the provider agent (we will refer to it as ap ∈ P ),
and the remaining n individuals take the role of the receiver agents. The provider
agent has the duty to fill up A by allocating 0 ≤ |A| ≤ m resources among the
n receiver agents in |A| steps (i.e. one resource at a time, the provider agent
may not distribute any resources, a receiver agent may obtain more than one re-
source). Each receiver agent ai has a goal which corresponds to the maximisation
of its si. However, the receiver agents cannot acquire the resources by themselves;
they will only acquire the resources distributed by the provider agent.
The features describing the scenario allow the provider agent to adopt many
different strategies to define A, which would suggest, to an external observer,
different levels of fairness towards the receiver agents and, possibly, also receiver
groups.
3.2 The Resource Allocation Game
To obtain a test-bed to evaluate the ad-hoc fairness metrics, and machine learn-
ing alternative data-driven metric, the one-to-many resource allocation scenario
described in Section 3.1 was implemented as a three-dimensional (3D), single
player game-based virtual environment; a virtual camera follows the movement
of the provider agent, creating a third-person perspective of the gameplay. The
provider agent finds himself in the environment together with receiver agents
and resources; his duty is to allocate the resources among the receiver agents
within a time limit by carrying only one resource at a time.
The satisfaction values of each receiver agent, which decrease constantly over
time, can be inferred by observing their yellow hats, which range in transparency
levels: the more transparent, the lower the satisfaction. When the receiver agent
acquires a resource, its satisfaction level is increased (i.e. its yellow hat gets more
opaque) by the value of the resource obtained. The resources are represented as
purple balls and their values are represented by their size: the smaller the ball,
the smaller its value provided.
The receiver agents have a coloured body which represents the group they
belong to (group identity). For the study presented in this paper, we examine
the presence of only two group structures, namely the red and the blue group.
A single distribution scenario (Equation 1) is interpreted, in our game-based
Fig. 1. A snapshot of the resource allocation game: 3 receiver agents (2 belonging to
the blue group and 1 belonging to the red group) and their satisfaction levels (yellow
hats), 4 resources of different sizes and the provider agent are depicted.
environment, as a game level. A snapshot of the resource allocation game can
be observed in Figure 1.
The decision to consider only two groups in our study is motivated by several
arguments, both theoretical and practical. First, the red and blue groups can be
easily linked to the in-group vs. out-group dichotomy [6, 9]: the detection of
unfair treatments — even across the whole population, i.e. independently on
the agent colours/groups — could be augmented by further detection of the
targeted subset of the population which received the most generous treatments,
and hence the subsequent identification of the colour/group the provider agent
belongs to [23, 24]. Second, the fact that some of the most relevant studies on
group behaviour and inequity aversion in human-centred experiments [6, 34, 42]
are based on two groups would allow for a possibly easier bridging between
the two different interpretations given to fairness. Finally, we did not want to
introduce any further complexity to the game-based scenario, which could bring
difficulties with respect to the perception of group-based unfair treatments (see
Subsection 4.5), given the novelty of the approach we decided to adopt.
3.3 Crowdsourcing Experimental Protocol
The game-based virtual environment was then used in a crowdsourcing survey.
In the survey, participants watched and annotated a sequence of strategy videos,
which reproduce resource distribution tasks (strategies) of our game. We have
relied on the ability of participants to compare and rank gameplay strategies
given in pairs (pairwise preference scheme) rather than having participants rat-
ing the strategies, for a number of advantages including the elimination of the
subjective notion of scaling and effects related to reporting order [58].
Table 1. Initial conditions of the four different scenarios of the survey. The si values
are partitioned according to the two red and blue group identities.
Scenario nred nblue m sred sblue vR
2 receivers 1 1 2 0.1 0.5 0.5, 0.9
3 receivers 2 1 4 0.1, 0.5 0.5 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.9
4 receivers 2 2 3 1, 0.8 0.2, 0.1 0.8, 0.4, 0.2
5 receivers 3 2 4 0.1, 0.3, 0.5 0.7, 0.9 0.3, 0.5, 0.7, 0.9
Six different strategies were recorded for four different scenarios — consisting
of 2, 3, 4 and 5 receiver agents — resulting in 24 strategy videos in total3. The
set of game-playing strategy videos used in the survey was defined in order to
show resource distribution strategies as different from each other as possible.
With respect to the game features we have described in Section 3.2, each game-
playing strategy is limited to 30 seconds. Table 1 illustrates the key features
of the four different scenarios designed: number of red receiver agents (“nred”
column), number of blue receiver agents (“nblue” column), number of resources
(“m” column), initial satisfaction values of the receiver agents (“sred” and “sblue”
columns) and value of the resources (“vR” column). As can be noted, the four
scenarios present unbalanced initial conditions, both with respect to the single
agents and to the average group satisfaction values.
The key protocol steps of the survey are as follows:
1. The participant fills in a demographic questionnaire (age, gender, experience
in playing games, whether the participant has already taken part in the
survey) and reads the instructions of the survey, which describe the resource
allocation scenario and the ways to provide feedback about the strategies.
2. A pair of strategy videos, A and B, is selected and presented on the same
screen (see Figure 2) — there is a 50% probability that the order of appear-
ance (left or right) of two strategies is inverted. The pair of strategy videos
presented to the participants belong to the same scenario (i.e. same number
of receivers).
3. The participant watches the videos and provides feedback through a 4-
alternative forced choice questionnaire (4-AFC), which asks the participant
if the behaviour of the provider was: (a) more fair in video A; (b) more fair
in video B; (c) equally fair in both video A and video B; (d) unfair in both
video A and video B. In order to allow the participant to fully grasp the
distribution dynamics, each video can be paused at any time and replayed
unlimitedly.
4. The participant can write additional comments via a free-response text box
and is free to take part in another session of the survey, ensuring that he
does not watch the same pair of strategy videos; otherwise the survey ends.
3 The videos of the 24 Scenarios can be found on the following link:
http://itu.dk/people/cogr/FairnessExperiment/TCCI_index.php
Fig. 2. A snapshot of the online survey
Considering that we have designed six strategies per scenario, and that we
show pairs of different strategies of the same scenario, we get C6,2 = 15 possible
combinations of video pairs by excluding repetitions and order of appearance on
screen (left or right). Any possible order effects are minimised via the randomi-
sation of the video ordering previously described.
For each of the four scenarios and the 15 possible combinations, we collected
four pairwise preferences. Thus, in total, our analysis is based on 4 · 15 · 4 = 240
strategy pairs that are labelled by our participants. The participants were gath-
ered through advertisement of the experiment on the well-know Facebook4 social
network online platform, in order to achieve the most diverse audience. The num-
ber of unique participants out of the 240 reports are 141, 74% of which are male
and 50.3% consider themselves gamers. The average age is 30.24 years and its
standard deviation is 6.84. Furthermore, 77% of the participants declared them-
selves as being either not a gamer or occasional gamers (i.e. playing up to 2
hours per week), 11% declared playing games from 2 to 5 hours per week, 8%
play from 5 to 10 hours per week, and 4% play for more than 10 hours per week.
4 Ad-Hoc Metrics of Fairness
This section first introduces the four generic metrics of dispersion of the data
used in our study, given the particular scenario described by the tuple defined
in Equation 1. The section ends with the definition of a new, ad-hoc designed
fairness metric proposed by the authors, which is tightened to the scenario in-
vestigated.
4 http://www.facebook.com
4.1 Standard Deviation
At the end of the distribution task, we calculate the average satisfaction of all
receiver agents as follows:
µ =
1
n
n∑
i=1
si (2)
The standard deviation is therefore defined as follows:
σ =
√√√√ 1
n
n∑
i=1
(si − µ)2 (3)
Since the upper bound of σ is 1 — both µ and si values range within the [0, 1]
interval — we can subtract σ from its maximum value in order to give it a
positive connotation of fairness:
SD = 1− σ (4)
In presence of fairness, the si values are similar to each other, making σ close
to zero and SD high. In contrast, in presence of unfair treatments, the si values
are very different from each other, making σ high and SD low.
4.2 Normalised Entropy
The Normalised Entropy [57] is calculated at the end of each distribution task
as follows:
NH = − 1
log(n)
n∑
i=1
sˆi log sˆi (5)
where sˆi represents the normalised satisfaction value of each receiver agents:
sˆi =
si∑n
j=1 sj
(6)
In presence of fairness, the sˆi values are similar to each other, thus yielding
a high normalised entropy. In contrast, in presence of unfair treatments, the sˆi
values are very different from each other, yielding low normalised entropy values.
4.3 Gini Coefficient
The Gini Coefficient [19] is a well-known measure of equality used in economic
studies. Providing that, at the end of each level, the si values of the receiver
agents are ordered by increasing values, that is:
ski ≤ sk+1j , i, j ∈ [1, n] (7)
The calculation of the Gini Coefficient in our game-based scenario is done as
follows:
GI =
1
n− 1
(
n+ 1− 2
(∑n
k=1 (n+ 1− k) sk∑n
k=1 s
k
))
(8)
Note that we have omitted the indices i in the representation for sk for simplicity.
GI lies within the [0, 1] interval: the lower the coefficient, the higher the fairness.
Hence, similarly to the SD implementation, we will take into consideration the
inverse of the Gini Coefficient:
GC = 1−GI (9)
4.4 Fairness Index
The Fairness Index [29] is a well-known measure of equality of resource allocation
vastly used in information networks. The metric is calculated at the end of each
distribution task as follows:
FI =
(
∑n
i=1 si)
2
n
∑n
i=1 s
2
i
(10)
FI has value one in presence of completely fair treatments among the whole
population, and it decreases as the disparity increases towards a subset of few
individuals.
4.5 Temporal Group-based Metrics of Fairness
We here propose a new metric of fairness — which is not as generic as the four
aforementioned metrics previously introduced — whose design is based on (and
bounded by) the following three constraints (or criteria):
(C1) The group identities of the receiver agents are not hidden from the provider
agent. The provider agent can be influenced by such information and there-
fore aim to deliver the resources based on the existing group structures,
rather than just focusing on the receiver agents’ satisfaction values.
(C2) The complex (and dynamic) structure of the scenario might have an impact
on the willingness of the provider agent to be either fair or unfair. The
metrics calculation should take into account the intermediate steps of the
distribution task, rather than solely focusing on the calculation at the end
of the scenario.
(C3) The initial configuration of each scenario might already depict an unfair
distribution of si values. A provider agent, who is willing to maximise the
satisfaction values of the whole population, should not avoid the delivery of
resources.
In our game, which considers two group structures — the red and blue agents,
see Section 3.2 — constraint (C1) is satisfied by the average satisfaction of the
red and the blue groups:
µred =
1
nred
nred∑
i=0
si, µblue =
1
nblue
nblue∑
i=0
si (11)
where, nred + nblue = n is the number of receiver agents belonging to the red
and the blue group, respectively. The between-group fairness is defined as the
absolute value:
|µred − µblue| (12)
Constraint (C2) is satisfied by averaging the between-group difference across the
0 < |A| ≤ m distributions:
1
|A|
|A|∑
t=1
∣∣µtred − µtblue∣∣ (13)
Where µtred and µ
t
blue represent, respectively, the between-group satisfaction val-
ues of the red and the blue groups after the t-th resource allocation. Finally, we
consider the case |A| = 0 in order to satisfy (C3):
TGB =
{
0 if |A| = 0
1− 1|A|
∑|A|
t=1 |µtred − µtblue| if 0 < |A| ≤ m
(14)
In presence of group-based fairness throughout the whole distribution task, the
µred and µblue values are, on average, similar to each other, thus yielding high
TGB values. In contrast, in presence of group-based unfair treatments through-
out the whole distribution task, the µred and µblue are, on average, different from
each other, generating low TGB values.
5 Data-Driven Approach: Preference Learning
We propose a data-driven method to model fairness as an alternative to the
hand-crafted metrics defined in Section 4. This approach imposes minimal expert
knowledge on the metrics which are instead shaped according to a specific dataset
containing strategies with different levels of fairness compared by human judges.
A data-driven technique, as opposed to hand-crafted metrics, can handle large
amounts of user data and learn patterns that human experts may have overseen.
We use ranking Support Vector Machines (SVMs) [27, 31], a well-known
method for learning non-linear estimators of user pairwise preferences such as
those present in the experimental data used in this paper. This method requires
that each input sample (i.e. strategy) is coded as a vector of numeric features
given by the designer. To reduce the human bias that could be introduced in
Table 2. Full feature list extracted for each allocation video across the four scenarios.
Bold feature numbers indicate the best extracted features by SVM’s the genetic feature
selection phase.
Feature Name Description
nred/n, nblue/n number of red/blue agents
|A|/m number of deliveries
nred/3, nblue/2
number of red/blue agents divided by 3/2, i.e.
their maximum number across all scenarios
nred/5, nblue/5
number of red/blue agents divided by 5, i.e. the
maximum number of agents across all scenarios
m/4
number of resources divided by 4, i.e. their
maximum number across all scenarios
|A|/4 number of deliveries divided by 4, i.e. the maximum
number of possible deliveries across all scenarios
µ0red, µ
0
blue initial average happiness of the red/blue agents∑m
j=1 vj average satisfaction value of the resources
vtj
for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, the value of the t-th resource
delivered. If |A| < t then the feature has value zero.
µtred
for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, average happiness of the red agents
after the t-th delivery. If the resource was delivered
to the blue group, then µtred = µ
t−1
red − δ. If |A| < t
then the feature has value zero.
µtblue
for t = 1, 2, 3, 4, average happiness of the blue agents
after the t-th delivery. If the resource was delivered
to the red group, then µtblue = µ
t−1
blue − δ. If |A| < t
then the feature has value zero.
this step, we use a large vector to describe each distribution strategy within a
scenario and later reduce it by automatic feature selection. The remainder of this
section describes the feature extraction process, the SVM, and the genetic-search
feature selection algorithm used.
5.1 Fairness Strategy Feature Extraction
To capture most aspects of the scenario in a format suitable for data-driven
modelling we extract a large number of features which could represent both its
initial conditions and its intermediate ones. In total, we extracted 24 features,
presented in Table 5.1.
5.2 Ranking Support Vector Machines
A Support Vector Machine is a binary classifier consisting of a linear combination
of training vectors:
w =
∑
xi∈D
αiφ(xi) (15)
The hyper-plane defined by this combination separates the data samples xi into
two classes in projected space φ(X). In this paper we are not interested in a
binary classifier but rather a function that maps data samples (strategies) into
a real-valued variable (estimation of fairness); additionally, our data samples are
associated with pairwise comparisons instead of discrete classes. Thus, we used
a variant of SVMs known as ranking SVM [27, 31], which is tailored to problems
with the same formulation. The model is still a linear combination of transformed
training vectors which is trained by optimising the following problem:
minimise:
1
2
||w||2 + C
∑
ξi
subject to: ∀(xiP,xiN) ∈ D,w · (φ(xiP)− φ(xiN)) ≥ 1− ξi
∀i ξi ≥ 0
(16)
where D is the complete set of training samples, (xiP,x
i
N) are pairs of training
samples such that the feature vector xiP was preferred (reported as more fair
in this paper) over the feature vector xiN, ξi are non-negative variables, C a
weighting parameter, w the trained decision boundary and ||w|| its module.
Once w is trained, given a pair of samples {xi,xj} the SVM predicts that xi is
preferred over xj if w·φ(xi) > w·φ(xj); thus, w·φ(x) is a computational predictor
of fairness. Although the SVM creates a linear separation, this is defined on the
transformed space defined by φ, which yields more complex functions in the
input space. As the transformation of the space can lead to an infinite number
of dimensions [27], and also in order to reduce computational costs, the predictor
is redefined in terms of the training examples and a kernel function:
w · φ(x) =
∑
(xiP,x
i
N)∈D
αi(κ(x,x
i
P)− κ(x,xiN)) (17)
where αi are non-negative coefficients, κ(xjxj) is the kernel function and (x
i
P,x
i
N)
are pairs of training samples.
For all experiments reported in this paper, we use a Gaussian projection (i.e.
Gaussian kernel) as it can generate a wide range of non-linear functions while it
contains one single parameter (γ). We set C = 0.001 and γ = 1.0 after systematic
adjustment of their values.
5.3 Automatic Feature Selection
Feature selection is a procedure commonly used in data mining to reduce the di-
mensionality of training data by removing features that seemingly do not contain
relevant information about the function modelled. The basic procedure consists
of evaluating several combinations of features using a predefined fitness func-
tion. In this paper we use a genetic algorithm to search the space of all possible
combinations of features — this is known as Genetic-search Feature Selection
(GFS) [40]. We use a population of 19 bit-chromosomes — their length being
the total number of features extracted — that represent whether a particular
feature is selected (1) or not (0). Across 15 iterations, pairs of feature subsets are
selected based on a ranking selection method (the higher the fitness of a feature
subset, the greater the probability of being selected) and recombined via uni-
form crossover (probability of 0.8) to generate new feature subsets (offspring).
A mutation operator adds or removes one feature to the offspring’s chromosome
with probability 0.01.
The fitness of each subset of features is calculated as the average 10-fold
cross-validation (CV) accuracy of an SVM employing a Gaussian kernel trained
on the available data using only the selected subset of features.
6 Results and Analysis
To measure the degree of agreement between the values provided by SD, NH,
GC, FI and TGB and the crowdsourced self-reports, we calculate the correla-
tion coefficients between them, following the statistical analysis procedure for
pairwise preference data presented in [57] using the test statistic:
c(z) =
N∑
i=1
{zi/N} (18)
where N is the total number of samples to correlate, zi = +1, if the video
reported as more fair in pair i yields a higher metric than the video reported
as less fair, and zi = −1, if the video reported as more fair in pair i yields
a lower metric than the video reported as less fair. In the calculation of c(z)
we only take into account clear preferences, that is, we only consider pairs in
which a clear preference — A is more fair than B or B is more fair than A
(2-AFC) — is expressed, that is, N = 147. The p-values of c(z) are obtained
via the binomial distribution. Tables 3(a), 3(b), 3(c), 3(d) and 3 present the
c(z) values and their corresponding p-values, for each scenario and in total, for
the metrics SD,NH, CG, FI and TGB respectively. The first three columns
(after the “Scenario” column) report the number of choices for the alternatives of
the 4-AFC. Columns “Match” and “Mismatch” represent the number of 2-AFC
preferences that respectively, match and mismatch the metric value.
6.1 Validating the Ad-hoc Metrics of Fairness
The first observable result is that all four metrics (SD, NH, GC and FI —
see Tables 3(a), 3(b), 3(c) and 3(d)) appear to be consistent with the reported
preferences. NH — and consequently FI, which presents the exact same results
— yield correlation values above 0.7 for the 4 receivers scenario, whilst the c(z)
values are not as high (just above 0.4) for the 2, 3, and 5 receiver scenarios. A
similar behaviour and c(z) values are observed for the GC metric.
Even though SD appears to be consistent with the notion of fairness, not
surprisingly, it is the metric which scores the lowest correlation coefficients, since
Table 3. Analysis of correlation c(z) between fairness metrics and reported fairness.
Significant c(z) values appear in bold — significance is 5%.
(a) SD
Scenario
2-AFC Equally Both
Match Mismatch c(z) p-value
Preference Fair Unfair
2 receivers 38 9 13 28 10 0.47 0.03
3 receivers 41 4 15 24 17 0.17 0.45
4 receivers 36 11 13 31 5 0.72 < 0.01
5 receivers 32 6 22 24 8 0.50 0.01
Total 147 30 63 107 40 0.46 0.02
(b) NH
Scenario
2-AFC Equally Both
Match Mismatch c(z) p-value
Preference Fair Unfair
2 receivers 38 9 13 29 9 0.53 0.01
3 receivers 41 4 15 29 12 0.41 0.05
4 receivers 36 11 13 31 5 0.72 < 0.01
5 receivers 32 6 22 25 7 0.56 < 0.01
Total 147 30 63 114 33 0.55 < 0.01
(c) GC
Scenario
2-AFC Equally Both
Match Mismatch c(z) p-value
Preference Fair Unfair
2 receivers 38 9 13 29 9 0.53 0.01
3 receivers 41 4 15 29 12 0.42 0.05
4 receivers 36 11 13 30 6 0.67 < 0.01
5 receivers 32 6 22 25 7 0.56 < 0.01
Total 147 30 63 113 34 0.54 < 0.01
(d) FI
Scenario
2-AFC Equally Both
Match Mismatch c(z) p-value
Preference Fair Unfair
2 receivers 38 9 13 29 9 0.53 0.01
3 receivers 41 4 15 29 12 0.41 0.05
4 receivers 36 11 13 31 5 0.72 < 0.01
5 receivers 32 6 22 25 7 0.56 < 0.01
Total 147 30 63 114 33 0.55 < 0.01
(e) TGB
Scenario
2-AFC Equally Both
Match Mismatch c(z) p-value
Preference Fair Unfair
2 receivers 38 9 13 27 11 0.42 0.06
3 receivers 41 4 15 35 6 0.71 < 0.01
4 receivers 36 11 13 31 5 0.72 < 0.01
5 receivers 32 6 22 23 9 0.44 0.04
Total 147 30 63 116 31 0.58 0.01
standard deviation is a measure of dispersion of the data with respect to a refer-
ence mean value. Although SD correlates well with the human notion of fairness
when highly fair and unfair strategies are existent, this does not necessarily hold
for strategies of intermediate levels of fairness.
Overall, TGB (see Table 3) scores a correlation coefficient higher (but not
significantly higher) than any other ad-hoc metric. Therefore, we can state that
TGB,NH — and consequentlyGC and FI — represent the notion of fairness for
the one-to-many interaction scenario equally well overall. TGB yields correlation
values above 0.7 for the 3 and 4 receivers scenario, whilst the c(z) values are not
as high (just above 0.4) for the 2 and the 5 receivers scenarios.
Compared to NH and FI, TGB manages to improve the correlation with
the perceived fairness for the 3 receivers scenario, however, at a cost of more
mismatches for the 2 and the 5 receivers scenarios. The 2 and 4 receivers scenarios
are those for which the c(z) values of TGB,NH,GC and FI are almost identical.
There is no doubt that 3 receivers is the most complex scenario among the 4
we have considered in our experimental setup: there is a difference in the group
sizes (nred = 2 and nblue = 1), a high amount of resources (m = 4), a big
difference in satisfaction within the red group itself, and finally, the resource
values are generally low, except for one, for which vi = 0.9 — see Table 1.
The 3 receiver scenario appears to have instigated different and complicated
perceptions of fairness among the participants, which can be better captured by
TGB, as opposed to the other metrics.
NH, GC and FI outperform TGB in the 5 receivers scenario as the metrics
generate two very different orderings of the strategies. It appears that the large
population size and the many available resources lead to a lower impact of exist-
ing group structures on the perception of fairness. In support of this hypothesis
many submitted comments of the participants suggest that a fair distribution
strategy should first prioritise the fulfilment of all receivers’ satisfaction indepen-
dently of their group identities and, only subsequently, distribute the resources
according to a group-based strategy.
The crowdsourced reports highlight that it is easier to report a clear fairness
preference (i.e. 2-AFC) for scenarios with a lower population (2 and 3 receivers)
rather than scenarios with a high population (4 and 5 receivers). This finding
suggests that there might be potential difficulties in observing and distinguishing
complex distribution strategies within our 3D game design. It is worth noting
in this respect that we received only three additional comments related to the
difficulty to perceive the distribution strategies; however, these were submitted
by inexperienced players, who spent only up to two hours on gaming per week,
as we could retrieve from their demographic entries.
6.2 Modelling Fairness via Preference Learning
As an alternative to ad-hoc metric design, we investigated the inverse approach
and followed a data-driven methodology to construct a model that is directly
built on the crowdsourced pairwise preferences, to be compared to the ad-hoc
metrics. For that purpose, we run GFS 10 times and pick the feature subset that
Table 4. Average and best performance across 10 trials of the rank SVM algorithm.
Performance accuracy is assessed through 10-fold cross-validation. Correlation values
(c(z)) are derived from the 10-fold CV accuracy.
Feature Set Accuracy (%) Matches Mismatches c(z)
Random Features
Average 73.54 108 39 0.47
Best 77.09 113 34 0.54
All Features
Average 74.95 110 37 0.50
Best 76.81 112 35 0.52
Best Feature Subset
Average 79.33 117 30 0.59
Best 81.86 120 27 0.63
feeds an SVM model (as described in Section 5) which yields the highest 10-fold
CV accuracy on the pairwise preference data. In order to reduce the impact of
non-determinism existent in the separation of the data into folds, we run 10 trials
of the algorithm using three different feature sets: the best-performing feature
set, the set that contains all 19 features extracted, and randomly selected fea-
tures. Table 4 reports the average and highest accuracies and the corresponding
c(z) values of the three different feature sets. The best performing feature set
yields accuracies which are significantly higher (tested via a t-test) when com-
pared to the full feature set (p-value < 0.01) and the randomly-selected feature
subset (p-value < 0.01). Thus, it appears that genetic feature selection (GFS)
improves the accuracy of the model, on average, (79.33%) as it outperforms
randomly selected features (73.54%) and all features (74.95%) considered.
The best-feature set (c(z) = 0.63) supports a model that outperforms the
correlation coefficient of the TGB metric. This model predicts 81.86% of the
pairwise fairness reports correctly relying on five features selected by GFS: the
initial average satisfaction value for the blue group (µ0blue); the average satisfac-
tion of the red group after the second delivery (µ2red); the average satisfaction
of the blue group after the second and third delivery (µ2blue and µ
3
blue, respec-
tively); and the satisfaction provided at the third delivery (v3j ). The selected
feature subset suggests that particular resource deliveries to particular groups
are of key importance for determining and approximating fairness.
7 Discussion
The TGB, NH, GC and FI ad-hoc metrics manage to represent the notion of
fairness well, as the cross-validation analysis performed with the data gathered
from the crowdsourcing experiment showed high consistency and strong statisti-
cal significance. The question of how to quantitatively model fairness precisely, in
order to subsequently infer the presence of social preferences, collaboration and
global patterns such as group identities has been answered, though only in part.
The key findings of the paper can evidently contribute to further investigations
for addressing the aforementioned question.
The difference in performance between TGB and the NH, GC and FI met-
rics suggests that the context-based, expert-driven metric TGB, might have
introduced some bias over-fitting to the examined scenario. It seems therefore
intuitive that, prior to considering TGB as a universal metric for one-to-many
interaction scenarios, similarly to NH, GC and FI, more studies should be con-
ducted. For instance, with respect to the scenario’s formal definition (Eq. 1),
studies based on a higher number of agents, groups, resources, and resource al-
locations, could be made. On the other hand, NH, GC and FI showed good
efficacy with respect to modelling fairness, even in the one-to-many scenario.
Finally, SD showed a low correlation with the perceived notion of fairness; this
is explained by the nature of the metric, which describes the dispersion of the
data based on a reference mean value. This suggests that fairness is an abso-
lute notion, rather than being relative to a reference satisfaction value. As a
consequence, it is likely that similar measures of fairness, e.g. the coefficient of
variation [29], would show similar performances.
By following our assumption that fairness is a feature of interactions which
can help with the identification of preferred individuals in the population, hence
group structures, we have been investigating methods to use fairness as a feature
for collaboration learning in order to detect the formation and consolidation of
group identities in complex artificial societies of believable, human-like artificial
agents [23, 24]. These agents manifested reciprocal and altruistic social prefer-
ences, interacting with each other, iteratively, by means of the ultimatum game.
The interaction scenario was interpreted as a sequence of one-to-many interac-
tions between one provider agent and many receiver agents, and NH was used
to calculate the fairness of the providers’ offers. The results obtained showed
that NH can help with the detection of existing group structures and is robust
across different population sizes, group structure typologies, and in presence of
diverse locality of interactions among the agents.
Future work would intuitively focus on the investigation of other metrics of
fairness. We hereby suggest either the definition of new metrics, or the identi-
fication of existing ones which would put an emphasis on the sequence of the
resources being distributed, which is only partly achieved by TGB. Moreover,
fairness can also be associated with a number of other complex notions, such as
balance [38] and asymmetry [41]. Finally, due to the positive correlation coeffi-
cients scored by the Fairness Index (FI), future studies will aim to investigate
how well other FI-related metrics [43] are linked to our scenario and how well
they would correlate to the crowdsourced self-reports.
While the SVM approach yielded high-performing fairness models (model
accuracy > 80%) that surpass the correlation of ad-hoc metrics with the crowd-
sourced data, the generalisability of the model to other settings is likely to be
lower as it is built on data and features from a particular environment. Neverthe-
less, as the accuracy is evaluated on data unseen during training, it is expected
to maintain its superiority within similar settings. Furthermore, the expressiv-
ity of the metrics over the black-box Gaussian SVM model provides a key ad-
vantage for their use. On that basis, more preference learning algorithms will
be tested and compared: possible candidates for learning the mapping between
pairwise preferences and social dynamics in the game include bayesian [8] and
neuro-evolutionary preference learning [39]. Towards the data-driven approach
to modelling fairness, more experimental data will be required from diverse and
dissimilar game scenarios containing variant numbers of agents, groups of agents
and initial conditions.
The self-reports and some of the extra comments filled by the participants
suggest that, particularly for occasional and non-gamers, the 3D game-based im-
plementation of the one-to-many resource allocation scenario, with an emphasis
on how to represent the levels of satisfaction of the agents, might add a bottleneck
with respect to the perception of fairness. This could also be the reason why the
participants are more confident to report clear preferences (A is more fair than
B or B is more fair than A) in scenarios with smaller populations. This drawback
could be reduced by allowing the participants to have a more active role, rather
than just following the provider agent and observing its allocation strategy. For
instance, future work could be focused on letting the participants play the role
of the provider agent, distribute resources, and subsequently describe the strate-
gies they adopted. Although this approach might introduce challenges on the
quantification of the strategy descriptions, it could on the other hand allow for
the discovery of alternative, highly complex distribution strategies.
The introduction of group identities in the population was motivated by the
intention to represent the existence of social preferences under the perspective
of the provider agent. The differences of group identities are to be found, solely,
on the colour of the body of the receiver agents. Moreover, the provider agent,
as depicted in both Figure 1 and Figure 2, does not explicitly belong neither
to the red nor to the blue group. Although there is a vast corpus of studies
suggesting that group behaviours and identities can be observed independently
on how arbitrarily the groups are instantiated (see [1, 5, 6, 9] among others),
the game design we adopted might not represent real-life, global structures, e.g.
ethnicity or friendship well and might explain why NH, GC and FI — which are
group-independent — correlate well with the self-reported data. Further work
on the enrichment of the graphical representation of the group identities would
be considered.
Although some of the motivations which led us to consider only two groups
were driven by the need to represent the dichotomy in-group vs. out-group [9]
(see Section 3.2), it might be possible that some of the metrics, especially TGB,
might not be able to scale well in presence of more complex scenarios. On the
other hand, more complex scenarios would lead to the increase of the number
of features describing the distribution strategies. As a consequence, it might be
possible that those features extracted via GFS for rank SVM would become
more generic, as opposed to those used by the best performing rank SVM for
the current two-group scenario (see Section 6.2). Given that we cannot clearly
foresee the changes in the consistency of NH, GC and FI — since more complex
scenarios would lead to a wider plethora of group-based distribution strategies,
and hence their human perception — future work based on scenarios with more
than two will be considered.
The proposed crowdsourcing approach for metric design proves that it is
possible to design accurate measures of fairness. Beyond our resource allocation
scenario, the proposed crowdsourcing approach can be used as a validation tool
to explain the discrepancies between the results obtained in evolutionary games
(i.e. based on artificial societies) and those found in nature [25]. Preliminary
results, based on artificial societies [23, 24], suggest that fairness is a feature of
interactions which would expose the preference of individuals. Thus, the metrics
TGB,NH,GC and FI (or any other metrics which correlate well to those) can
be used to detect unfair treatments which may lead to social conflicts [7, 61].
Similarly, fairness metrics can be used to extract student profiles in collaborative
educational games [21, 61].
8 Conclusions
This paper addressed the problem of quantitatively measuring fairness, under
the perspective of one individual who interacts with multiple other individuals
(i.e. one-to-many interaction scenario). Given that fairness is an abstract and
ambiguous term with fuzzy boundaries, we have relied on crowdsourced data
obtained via pairwise preference self-reports, and used it to cross validate six
metrics of fairness. The first four metrics are well-established metrics of the
dispersion of data, namely standard deviation, normalised entropy, the Gini co-
efficient, and the Fairness Index. The fifth metric, called temporal group-based
fairness (TGB), is a new metric proposed by the authors, is ad-hoc designed
for the one-to-many interaction scenario, and takes into consideration context-
based aspects of the distribution task, such as the sequence of distribution and
the presence of group structures within the receiver agents. Finally, the sixth
metric is machine learned on the preference data via ranking Support Vector
Machines (SVM).
The results obtained show that all metrics are highly consistent (though with
different degrees of consistency) with the perception of fairness of hundreds of
our survey participants. It seems, however, that the temporal group-based metric
is expressive enough and captures fairness more accurately than the other ad-
hoc metrics. Even though the SVM model yields the most accurate fairness
measure, the TGB metric is far more expressive and usable. The normalised
entropy and fairness index metrics, however, appear to be the most appropriate
for context-free and generic use, as the TGB metric is based on (and tightened
to) the context of the one-to-many resource allocations scenario. Preliminary
results have shown the efficacy of NH in capturing fairness and collaboration in
artificial societies of agents that play the social ultimatum game [23, 24].
The fairness metrics proposed can be used in both simulated scenarios of ar-
tificial agent societies to investigate global phenomena, such as collaboration and
the emergence of group structures [23, 24], or in educational collaborative virtual
environments, in which human-controlled avatars interact with each other [21,
61].
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